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10.1  Introduction 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 
1967 by  the noncommunist and market-oriented economies of Indonesia, Ma- 
laysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei became a member in 
1984. A new milestone was reached in July 1995 when Vietnam, a communist 
country undergoing transformation from a command to a market economy and 
a former adversary, joined ASEAN. The new ASEAN-7 is expected to expand 
to ASEAN-10 when the remaining countries of  Southeast Asia, Cambodia, 
Laos, and Myanmar (CLM), join the grouping over the next few years. While 
the membership extension is expected to strain ASEAN's consensus-building 
style in the short term, it will contribute to regional peace, stability, and eco- 
nomic dynamism in the longer term. 
ASEAN-6 (excluding Vietnam) has been widely regarded as the most suc- 
cessful economic cooperation grouping among developing countries. It was 
also the world's  most economically dynamic region during the past decade. 
The collapse of oil and commodities prices starting in the early 1980s led the 
ASEAN-4 economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) to 
embark on far-reaching economic reforms, with deregulation, liberalization, 
privatization, and promotion of export manufacturing and foreign direct invest- 
ment. The economic successes of the ASEAN-6 countries are due to national 
efforts rather than directly attributable to regional economic cooperation. Re- 
gional trade liberalization efforts have had little effect on intraregional trade, 
and industrial cooperation schemes have had no noticeable impact on indus- 
trial development in the ASEAN countries. In  fact, ASEAN has often been 
Chia Siow Yue is associate professor of economics in the Department of Economics and Statis- 
tics, National University of  Singapore, and advisor on the APEC research program at the Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. 
275 276  Chia Sow  Yue 
criticized  as  lacking meaningful economic integration. However, to judge 
ASEAN as a regional grouping only by  the criterion of economic integration 
is to misunderstand the role of ASEAN as envisaged by  its founding fathers. 
The initial objective in ASEAN’s formation was  not  economic integration 
based on the EC model, but the promotion of political stability and security 
in the region so as to provide the underpinnings for each country’s economic 
development efforts. 
Rapidly changing external and domestic environments, however, have led 
ASEAN to accelerate the process of economic integration since 1992 through 
the ASEAN free trade area (AFTA) and ASEAN growth triangles. These are 
not GATTNTO-inconsistent, as they seek to improve regional and national 
competitiveness rather than to protect the ASEAN economies against external 
competition. This paper first discusses the diversities among ASEAN econo- 
mies, their external orientation, and the first 25 years of economic cooperation 
efforts, before proceeding to an analysis of AFIA and growth triangles as mo- 
dalities of regional economic cooperation. 
10.2  The ASEAN Economies 
10.2.1  Regional Diversities 
The ASEAN-6 countries show considerable diversities in historical experi- 
ence, sociocultural background, size, level of  economic development, indus- 
trial structure, and trade orientation. Historically, Brunei, Malaysia, and Singa- 
pore were under British colonial rule, Indonesia under the Dutch, and the 
Philippines under the Spanish and Americans, while Thailand was never for- 
mally colonized. The colonial economies have been oriented toward the colo- 
nizing countries rather than toward Southeast Asia or East Asia, and postcolo- 
nial  efforts  to  strengthen  regional  trading  ties  have  been  inhibited  by 
similarities in resource endowment and in level of industrial competence and 
by limited linking infrastructure. 
Indonesia is the largest member of ASEAN in geographical area, popula- 
tion, and GNP (table 10.1). It has a population of  191 million, compared to 
Singapore’s 2.9 million and Brunei’s 300,000. However, it is the least economi- 
cally advanced ASEAN economy, with a 1994 per capita income of U.S.$SSO, 
as  against  U.S.$23,360  for  Singapore. Per  capita  income  differences  in 
ASEAN  are larger  than  found in  other  developing  country groupings. In 
ASEAN, the largest country is also the least developed so that differences in 
economic size are not as stark. Indonesia’s GNP in 1993, unadjusted for pur- 
chasing power parity (PPP), was only 2.5 times larger than Singapore’s; ad- 
justed for PPP, however, Indonesia’s GNP was  almost 11 times Singapore’s. 
Indonesia’s  low  profile as a regional hegemon  has  contributed to ASEAN 
harmony. 
The ASEAN economies, excepting Singapore, are rich in natural resources, Table 10.1  Basic Indicators of ASEAN Economies 
Indicator  Brunei  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand  ASEAN-6 
Land area (thousand sq. km) 
Population, 1994 (million) 
Total GNP, 1993 (million U.S. $) 
Per capita GNP, 1994 (US. $) 
PPP adjusted, 1993 
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Sources: Asian Development Bank (1995, 1996) and World Bank (1995). 
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and their economic development until the 1970s was largely resource based. 
Since then, the ASEAN-4 countries have been rapidly industrializing and re- 
ducing their dependence on primary products. As is common among devel- 
oping countries, industrialization started with import substitution. The switch 
to export manufacturing was half-hearted in the 1970s, but the collapse of oil 
and commodity prices in the early 1980s led to a stronger export orientation. 
The import liberalization ratio (unrestricted imports to total imports) reached 
more than 95 percent in Malaysia and Thailand by  1985, 83 percent in the 
Philippines by  1986, and 84 percent in Indonesia by  1987 (World Bank 1987). 
The rapid growth of manufactured exports has been facilitated by massive in- 
flows of foreign direct investment. The share of manufactures in total exports 
rose dramatically from 2 percent in 1970 to 53 percent in 1993 for Indonesia, 
from 7 percent to 65 percent for Malaysia, from 7 percent to 77 percent for the 
Philippines, and from 8 percent to 73 percent for Thailand (World Bank 1995). 
Brunei remains an oil-dependent economy, with industrialization prospects se- 
verely constrained by  its small population base. Singapore with its strategic 
location and free trade policy has served as the regional entrep6t for centuries. 
It is the manufacturing base of multinational corporations (MNCs) and a re- 
gional commercial, transportation, and financial hub. 
10.2.2  Intra- and Extraregional Trade and Investment Linkages 
The  ASEAN-6  countries  have  highly  open  economies,  as  measured  by 
trade-GNP ratios (table 10.1) and the extent of foreign investment penetration, 
with the smaller economies more open than the larger ones. However, extrare- 
gional trade and investment linkages are quantitatively more important than 
intraregional linkages. The main trading partners of the ASEAN-6 are the 
OECD countries, both for import sourcing and for export markets. For imports, 
the ASEAN-6 is most dependent on Japan, followed by the United States and 
the European Union (table 10.2). For exports, the ASEAN-6 is most dependent 
on the United States, followed by Japan and the European Union. The grouping 
is thus seriously concerned with rising regionalism in North America and Eu- 
rope and possibilities of reduced market access. The asymmetrical and triangu- 
lar relationship is most evident in the trade in manufactures; the ASEAN-6 is 
heavily dependent on Japan as a source of capital goods and on the United 
States as a market for manufactures. In 1992, Japan accounted for 26 and 10 
percent of imports and exports, respectively, of manufactures of the ASEAN- 
6, while the United States accounted for less than 15 percent of imports and 
over 20 percent of exports of manufactures. 
Although ASEAN has existed since 1967 and has implemented preferential 
trading arrangements since 1977, intra-ASEAN trade has neither become more 
important nor grown faster than extra-ASEAN trade, so that trade diversion has 
not been dominant. In 1993, intra-ASEAN trade accounted for 19.3 percent of 
the total trade of the ASEAN-6, with a share of 18.1 percent for imports and 
20.7 percent for exports (table 10.2). While the intra-ASEAN share of ASEAN Table 10.2  Trade Matrix of ASEAN Economies, 1993 
World 
Indo-  Singa-  East  (mill  ion 
Country  Brunei  nesia  Malaysia  Philippines  pore  Thailand  ASEAN-6  Vietnam  Asia"  Japan  EU  U.S.  World  U.S. $) 
Brunei 
Indonesia  0.1 
Malaysia  0.4 
Philippines  0.0 
Singapore  0.8 
Thailand  0.1 
ASEAN-6  0.4 
Vietnam  0.0 
Brunei 
Indonesia  0.0 
Malaysia  0.0 
Philippines  0.3 
Singapore  0.2 
Thailand  0.4 
ASEAN-6  0.2 
Vietnam  0.0 
Brunei  0.0 
Indonesia  0.1 
Malaysia  0.2 
Philippines  0.2 
Singapore  0.5 
Thailand  0.3 
ASEAN-6  0.3 























0.1  2.3 
1.6  0.8 
1  .o 
1.4 
13.8  1.8 
2.8  0.5 
5.8  1.1 
2.8  0.4 
8.0  0.1 
1.8  0.2 
0.5 
2.0 
15.8  0.6 
3.6  0.4 
7.3  0.4 
2.8  0.8 
4.2  1.1 
1.7  0.5 
0.0  0.8 
1.8  0.0 
14.9  1.1 
3.3  0.5 
6.6  0.8 
2.8  0.7 
Exports (percentuge distribution) 
8.3  8.6  19.3  0.0 
9.2  1.3  12.9  0.5 
21.7  3.6  27.9  0.3 
3.4  1.5  6.7  0.4 
5.6  24.4  1.3 
12.0  16.0  0.3 
8.9  3.2  20.7  0.7 
10.6  2.6  17.6 
26.8  1.5  38.3  0.0 
6.3  0.8  9.2  0.1 
15.3  2.5  19.8  0.2 
5.7  1  .o  9.6  0.1 
4.0  24.4  0.4 
6.4  12.0  0.2 
5.9  2.2  18.1  0.3 
20.0  2.4  29.5 
Exports + Imports (percentage distribution) 
18.0  4.9  29.3  0.0 
7.9  1.1  11.3  0.3 
18.5  3.1  23.9  0.2 
4.8  1.2  8.5  0.2 
0.0  4.7  24.4  0.8 
8.9  0.0  13.8  0.2 
7.3  2.7  19.3  0.5 
16.6  2.4  25.2  0.0 

























54.2  17.9  1.2  100.0 
30.3  14.4  14.2  100.0 
13.0  14.5  20.3  100.0 
16.3  16.9  38.3  100.0 
7.3  13.7  19.9  100.0 
17.0  17.0  21.6  100.0 
15.3  14.8  20.1  100.0 
32.3  19.6  0.0  100.0 
5.4  27.1  20.2  100.0 
22.1  19.9  11.5  100.0 
27.5  11.6  17.0  100.0 
22.8  10.3  19.8  100.0 
21.0  11.0  15.7  100.0 
30.3  14.9  11.7  100.0 
24.3  13.2  15.0  100.0 
13.1  11.2  0.1  100.0 
28.7  22.7  11.2  100.0 
26.7  16.8  13.0  100.0 
20.1  13.1  18.7  100.0 
20.3  12.8  26.9  100.0 
14.7  12.3  17.6  100.0 
24.4  15.9  16.1  100.0 
20.0  13.9  17.4  100.0 

























Source: International Monetary Fund (1994). 
"East  Asia = Japan, China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, ASEAN-6, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Table 103  Intra-ASEAN Trade Matrix, 1980 and 1993 
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Exports (percentage distribution) 
7.6  8.8 
0.4  11.8 
2.2  6.6 





55.5  5.2 
56.7  1.4 
21.5  2.2 
17.5  3.3 
26.2  5.6 
28.2  5.5 
15.6  1.9 
20.9  0.3 
2.7  6.7 
19.9  2.2 
6.0 
2.4 





















































































































































29.0  23.7 
21.1  59.2 
50.7  1.1 
64.9  2.3 
27.1  2.2  46.5 
30.3  3.3  53.8 
33.5  2.6  25.7 
40.5  2.3  32.4 
9.2  7.4  55.7 
14.4  3.9  61.4 
2.3  6.6  83.2 
15.0  4.6  10.2 
6.5  79.1 
3.2  11.5 
27.3  26.1 
21.1  56.6 
52.8  3.0 
61.1  4.7 
21.3  2.2  46.9 
23.7  3.3  64.9 
29.6  4.2  36.1 
34.2  3.9  37.7 
Exports i  Imports (percentage distribution) 
3.9 





























































Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of  Trade Statistics  Yearbook (Washington, D.C., various issues). 282  Chia Siow Yue 
imports has grown significantly since 1970, the share for exports has not shown 
an upward trend. Singapore, the most trade-oriented ASEAN country and the 
region’s entrepet, accounted for the largest share of intra-ASEAN trade (table 
10.3), followed by  Malaysia, while Brunei and the Philippines combined ac- 
counted for less than 6 percent. Excluding Singapore, intra-ASEAN trade falls 
to less than 5 percent of ASEAN’s total trade. The bulk of intra-ASEAN trade 
is accounted for by bilateral trade between Singapore and Malaysia. Low trade 
linkages among the ASEAN countries (excluding Singapore) reflect low eco- 
nomic complementarity and similar levels of industrial competence. The coun- 
tries produce largely similar processed resources and labor-intensive manufac- 
tures. They cannot absorb each other’s primary products and cannot supply 
each other’s needs for technology and capital goods. They compete with each 
other for markets in North America, Europe, and Japan. However, in recent 
years, trade linkages have expanded with the growth of FDI-related intraindus- 
try trade. 
The ASEAN region has strong locational advantages and is a major recipient 
of FDI (table 10.4). Indonesia accounted for the largest share of  the inward 
FDI stock, followed by  Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. 
FDI inflows accelerated in the 1980s, particularly in the post-1987 period. The 
traditional sources of FDI were the United States and Western Europe. Japan 
became a major source in the 1970s and particularly after the sharp yen ap- 
preciation in the mid-1980s (Chia 1993). While Singapore has remained de- 
pendent on FDI from the Triad (United States, European Community, and Ja- 
pan), the ASEAN-4 countries have experienced a surge in FDI from the Asian 
NIEs in recent years. Vietnam has also become a strong contender for FDI, 
both from the Asian NIEs and ASEAN and, more recently, from Japan. 
Intra-ASEAN investment (excluding Vietnam) remained small relative to 
inflows from outside the group, although it is suspected that a sizable amount 
of intraregional investment is not captured by  official statistics. As shown in 
table 10.4, intra-ASEAN investment accounted for only 9.2 percent ofASEAN’s 
total FDI stock in  1992, with a 6.3 percent  share of  the inward investment 
stock and 33.3 percent share of the outward investment stock. The low level of 
intraregional industrial investment reflects the facts that the ASEAN econo- 
mies depend on extraregional sources for capital and technology and ASEAN 
investors possess limited ownership advantages over local firms. As show in 
table 10.5, Singapore is the main regional investor, while Malaysia is the main 
recipient. Over 75 percent of the intraregional investment stock in 1992 is be- 
tween Singapore and Malaysia. This strong bilateral investment link mirrors 
the strong bilateral trade link. The strong Singapore-Malaysia trade and invest- 
ment linkages reflect common historical ties under British colonial rule, close 
geographical proximity (a common border), and strong economic complemen- 
tarity. Table 10.4  Foreign Direct Investment Matrix of ASEAN Economies, 1992 
World 



















0.2  0.0 
3.6  0.2 
n.a.  0.3 
0.1  3.9  0.3 
0.1  0.4  0.1 
0.6  1.1  0.1 
34.5  0.0 
6.2  0.6 
1.7  5.1 
1.9  22.1  0.6 
3  .O  1.1  0.0 
2.2  19.3  0.5 
1.5  0.0 
3.9  0.2 
0.3  1.2 
0.5  8.3  0.3 
0.3  0.4  0.1 
0.8  3.1  0.2 
Inward FDI Stock (percentage distribution) 
3.3  0.2  3.7  43.7  19.3 
10.4  0.3  14.5  60.3  23.7 
1 .O  n.a.  1.2  31.4  9.1 
0.9  5.2  35.2  6.5 
8.5  9.1  66.0  22.7 
4.0  0.3  6.3  45.9  16.8 
1.6  0.7  36.8  40.8  2.6 
64.2  2.2  73.1  81.9  7.3 
10.5  0.8  18.0  89.6  66.6 
2.6  27.1  48.7  19.5 
12.8  17.0  50.2  29.7 
9.3  2.1  33.3  53.9  18.5 
3.2  0.2  4.9  43.6  18.7 
15.0  0.5  19.5  62.1  22.3 
2.7  0.1  4.3  41.8  19.4 
1.3  10.4  38.4  9.6 
8.7  9.5  65.1  23.1 
4.6  0.5  9.2  46.8  17.0 
Outward FDI Stock (percentage distribution) 
Inward + Outward FDI Stock (percentage distribution) 
20.7  10.7  4.3 
21.6  17.9  9.0 
21.0  10.5  47.4 
23.3  23.1  17.0 
34.0  10.2  17.3 
22.7  15.0  10.8 
0.4  49.2  4.2 
n.a.  0.3  3.5 
n.a.  2.5  7.8 
0.4  7.2  9.0 
0.6  5.4  35.3 
0.4  12.0  8.6 
20.0  12.1  4.3 
19.7  16.4  8.6 
17.3  9.1  40.3 
17.6  19.3  15.1 
32.2  10.0  18.3 





































Source: APEC Secretariat 1995. Table 10.5  Intra-ASEAN Direct Investment Matrix, 1980 and 1992 
ASEAN-5 
Country  Year  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand  ASEAN-5  (million US.$) 
Indonesia  1980 
1992 
Malaysia  1980 
1992 
Philippines  1980 
1992 
Singapore  1980 
1992 
Thailand  1980 
1992 
1992 
Indonesia  1980 
1992 
Malaysia  1980 
1992 
Philippines  1980 
1992 
Singapore  1980 
1992 
Thailand  1980 
1992 
1992 
ASEAN-5  1980 
ASEAN-5  1980 
Indonesia  1980 
I992 
Malaysia  1980 
1992 
Philippines  1980 
1992 
Singapore  1980 
1992 
Thailand  1980 
1992 






















Inward FDI Stock (percentage distribution) 
12.3  19.5  65.1  3.0 
5.7  0.6  89.5  4.2 
0.0  99.0  0.8 
I .4  71.6  2.0 
7.1  92.9  0.0 
23.6  76.4  0.0 
86.3  1.4  3.4 
75.3  5.1  17.5 
17.3  4.4  77.6 
4.1  0.6  93.8 
15.5  2.1  79.5  1.4 
18.0  1.8  64.4  5.6 
6.0  0.0  92.6  1.4 
93.8  0.0  4.3  1.9 
0.1  89.4  3.5 
0.8  87.7  3.0 
1 .o  10.9  6.7 
28.1  58.0  4.4 
93.6  1.8  1  .o 
81.5  2.2  9.5 
Outward FDI Stock (percentage distribution) 
0.0  0.0  100.0 
6.5  0.1  75.6 
49.6  1  .o  38.4  2.3 

























Inward + Outward FDI Stock (percentage distribution) 
11.4  16.6  69.3  2.8  100.0 
30.0  0.5  66.0  3.6  100.0 
1.3  0.0  97.3  1.3  100.0 
19.8  1.2  76.7  2.3  100.0 
73.2  1.6  19.2  6.0  100.0 
7.1  27.0  62.5  3.4  100.0 
5.9  90.5  1.6  2.0  100.0 
5.0  79.1  3.3  12.6  100.0 
0.7  17.2  4.4  77.8  100.0 
3.1  4.3  0.6  92.0  100.0 
3.6  25.3  1.8  67.7  1.6  100.0 
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10.3  Economic Cooperation Rationale and Modalities 
10.3.1  Rationale for Cooperation 
ASEAN’s formation was motivated more by political and strategic than by 
economic considerations (Khoman 1992; Rajaratnam 1992). The Cold War, 
the Indochina conflicts, domestic communist insurgency activities, and fear of 
falling dominoes propelled the noncommunist countries of Southeast Asia to 
put aside territorial disputes and form a club to promote regional stability and 
security, with economic development providing the underpinnings. ASEAN, 
therefore, has both a political security dimension and an economic dimension. 
ASEAN is generally perceived to have been successful in achieving its polit- 
ical security goals. First, the grouping has made remarkable strides in promot- 
ing political cohesion and reducing territorial conflicts.’ Regional stability has 
provided the environment in which individual ASEAN countries can pursue 
their economic development goals. Second, ASEAN solidarity has enabled the 
grouping to play an increasingly influential role in the political and strategic 
affairs of  the Asia Pacific. ASEAN has established regular formal dialogues 
with global and regional powers. ASEAN has also become a focal point for 
dialogues and arrangements on regional security with the establishment of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994. Third, ASEAN’s political influence has ex- 
tended into wider regional and global economic forums, giving it influence out 
of proportion to its economic strength. This is particularly evident in the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, where ASEAN positions carry 
considerable weight and ASEAN members alternate with other APEC mem- 
bers in assuming the annual leadership 
Perhaps ASEAN’s sustainability as a regional economic grouping lay in re- 
jecting the EC economic integration model in its formative years, and in prac- 
ticing the principles of accommodation and of consensus in decision making. 
For the first 25 years of ASEAN’s  existence, official documents avoided the 
term “integration” and emphasized only “cooperation,” as ASEAN policymak- 
ers were not prepared to consider either a free trade area or a customs union 
as they pursued national import substitution strategies. Further, the agenda for 
economic cooperation, as laid out in the 1976 ASEAN Concord, was reached 
only nine years after ASEAN’s establishment. The Concord provided, inter 
alia, for economic cooperation in trade and industrial development, banking 
and finance, food and energy, tourism and transport, and joint approaches to 
international economic issues. ASEAN has been fairly successful in various 
1. During 1963-65  Indonesia launched a confrontation against the newly formed Federation of 
Malaysia (which then included Singapore) in protest against the inclusion of the Borneo states of 
Sabah and Sarawak in the new federation. There are overlapping temtorial claims among all the 
ASEAN nations. 
2. The United States hosted the first AF’EC  summit and headed the AF’EC  Secretariat in 1993, 
followed by Indonesia in 1994, Japan in 1995, and the Philippines in 1996. 286  Chia Siow Yue 
areas of  functional cooperation and in  maintaining a joint approach toward 
extra-ASEAN economic relations (Chia 1994). ASEAN economic ministers 
and officials meet regularly to exchange information and views, develop com- 
mon positions, and initiate and review action programs. 
Aspects of economic cooperation other than trade and industrial cooperation 
will not be discussed in this paper.3  The principles of accommodation and con- 
sensus in decision making have meant that those that wished to move at a faster 
pace had to accommodate the more cautious and smaller members need not 
fear the dominance of  larger members. However, the resulting convoy effect 
has slowed the pace of  economic cooperation. The less developed ASEAN 
member countries were reluctant to open their markets to competition from 
the more advanced members, and the more advanced countries were reluctant 
to enter into exclusive industrial cooperation arrangements with the inefficient 
industries of the less advanced members, which would adversely affect their 
overall competitiveness. 
In 1992, the ASEAN-6 reached a milestone agreement to form a free trade 
area and pushed for further subregional economic integration via formation of 
growth triangles. The changed mindset and more serious attempts at economic 
integration reflected the interplay of both external and domestic political and 
economic forces. The end of  the Cold War  and the Indochina conflict have 
weakened ASEAN’s political and strategic underpinnings; previously, ASEAN 
was of  strategic interest to the global superpowers, and geopolitical interests 
also kept ASEAN members united and purposeful. At the same time, develop- 
ments in the economic arena increased the acceptability of economic integra- 
tion and a free trade area. First, the ASEAN-4 economies had been undergoing 
unilateral  liberalization since the  mid- 1980s, resulting in  outward-looking 
trade and investment strategies, converging tariff levels, and increased FDI in- 
flows directed at export manufacturing.  The less developed ASEAN economies 
gained industrial competence, lessening the fear of competition from the more 
advanced ASEAN economies. With the growth of intraindustry trade, ASEAN 
economies became more complementary and integrated. Second, Fortress Eu- 
rope, the emergence of NAFTA, and the slow progress of the Uruguay Round 
gave rise to concerns over market access for ASEAN’s rapidly growing export- 
oriented industries. A regional market provides a strategic fallback position 
and improves ASEAN’s bargaining leverage vis-2-vis trading blocs and protec- 
tionist trading partners. 
Third, ASEAN-6 faces growing competition from the transitional econo- 
mies of Eastern Europe, China, and Indochina, as well as from the liberalizing 
economies in Latin America and South Asia. Trade liberalization removes price 
distortions, and an integrated regional market will enable ASEAN industries 
3. For discussions of ASEAN cooperation in food and energy, banking and finance, and trans- 
port and tourism, see the articles by  Cabanilla, Sharma, Schulze, Wong, and Naidu in Sandhu et 
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to benefit from internal competition, economies of scale, and regional special- 
ization according to comparative advantage. Intra-ASEAN trade liberalization 
could be a useful stepping stone toward multilateral liberalization and interna- 
tional competitiveness. Fourth, as the global competition for FDI intensified 
in the 1980s there was concern over possible investment diversion to China, 
Indochina, India, Eastern Europe, and Mexico, as many of these countries have 
either huge domestic markets or lower cost structures or both. An ASEAN free 
trade area will increase the attraction of ASEAN as a production base and as a 
market for MNCs. Intra-ASEAN trade liberalization could also exploit the 
trend of MNCs toward globalization of production, encouraging them to estab- 
lish and expand production bases in ASEAN and develop intraregional produc- 
tion networks. 
10.3.2  Trade and Industrial Cooperation during 1976-92 
From the perspective of economic integration, the most important programs 
are those aimed at intraregional trade liberalization and industrial cooperation. 
However, perceptions of  zero-sum competition and politically unacceptable 
distribution of benefits and costs have resulted in slow progress. The ASEAN 
Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) was introduced in  1977 as the main 
instrument to promote intraregional trade, but there was lack of  serious intent 
as member countries continued to pursue national import substitution. The ini- 
tial product-by-product approach and the requirement to periodically exchange 
a prescribed number of  tariff preferences led to bizarre results that reduced 
the credibility of ASEAN economic cooperation. The tariff classification was 
disaggregated, and the number of tariff items subject to preferences ballooned 
without much growth in trade values. Further, negotiated items included prod- 
ucts insignificant in intra-ASEAN trade or not even produced or consumed in 
ASEAN countries, such as nuclear reactors and snowplows. Subsequent at- 
tempts at limited across-the-board tariff reductions were largely nullified by 
exclusion lists that  included many  products with  significant intra-ASEAN 
trade potential. Nontariff barriers further eroded the effectiveness of tariff pref- 
erences. As a result, the PTA  scheme had only a marginal impact on intra- 
ASEAN trade, as reflected in the low PTA  utilization rate. Out of a total of 
12,783 items on the PTA  list in 1986, only 337, or 2.6 percent, of  the items 
were granted tariff preferences, and only 19 percent of the total value of these 
items satisfied the eligibility criteria and actually enjoyed tariff preferences 
(Pangestu, Soesastro, and Ahmad 1992). 
ASEAN also implemented three industrial cooperation schemes with lim- 
ited success, namely, the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP), the ASEAN Indus- 
trial Complementation (AIC) scheme, and the ASEAN Industrial Joint Ven- 
tures (AIJV). The AIP was initiated in 1976 and was meant to be a showpiece 
of  regional economic cooperation. However, the scheme led to contentious 
disputes between government officials over choice and location of  regional 
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introduced in 1981 and modified into the Brand-to-Brand (BBC) scheme in 
1988 to encourage regional production and exchange of automotive parts and 
components for specified automotive brand models. Some 70 BBC projects 
have been approved, involving more than  10 automotive manufacturers. The 
AIJV  scheme  was  introduced  in  1983 to  encourage industrial  investment 
through resource pooling  and market-sharing  activities. A total of  23 AIJV 
projects have been approved. Although the AIC, BBC, and AIJV schemes em- 
phasized private sector participation, continuing government efforts to influ- 
ence industrial location, the cumbersome and slow bureaucratic approval pro- 
cess,  and  nonparticipation  by  some  countries  reduced  the  attraction  and 
viability of the schemes. 
The limited progress with the ASEAN trade liberalization and industrial co- 
operation schemes noted above reflects lack of economic complementarity, dif- 
ferent levels of industrial competence, pursuit of national import substitution 
strategies, and perceptions of  zero-sum competition. First, the structures of the 
ASEAN-4 economies were more competitive than complementary. Being at 
similar initial  stages  of  industrialization,  each ASEAN  country  wanted  to 
protect its industries from foreign (including ASEAN) competition. Second, 
where economic complementarity did exist,  as between  Singapore and the 
ASEAN-4, there was fear of  an unacceptable regional division of labor and 
distribution of benefits and costs if investment decisions were left to market 
forces. The perception was that Singapore, with the most advanced and com- 
petitive economy, would benefit most from regional free trade. Solution of the 
distributive issue in ASEAN was hampered by the fact that the largest econ- 
omy, Indonesia, was also the least developed, while the richer economies of 
Brunei and Singapore were small and had limited capacity to fund regional 
structural adjustment and development cooperation programs. To resolve the 
deadlocks that resulted  from applying  the principle  of  consensus, ASEAN 
adopted the “6 minus x” principle, which allowed individual countries to opt 
out of participation in specific cooperation schemes. 
10.3.3  ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
The fourth ASEAN summit of January 1992 agreed to the establishment of 
a free trade area. AFTA is intended to help ASEAN economies achieve greater 
trade and investment competitiveness in the global economy. AFTA (including 
Vietnam) will have an integrated regional market of  over 400 million people 
with a combined purchasing power of over U.S.$400 billion growing at 6-8 
percent a year and embraces countries with a wide range of resource endow- 
ment and skills. The pooling of resources and markets would increase the at- 
traction of the ASEAN region to regional and foreign investors. MNCs locating 
in ASEAN will be able to exploit scale economies and rationalize production, 
allocating different  segments of the value chain, production processes,  and 
products among the ASEAN countries according to their respective competi- 
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AFTA  focuses on the liberalization of  trade in goods within the ASEAN 
region through implementation of  the Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT). However, the CEPT scheme as first agreed upon in January 1992 had 
several limitations. First, unlike NAFTA, which contained over 2,000 pages of 
technical details, the AFTA  and CEPT agreements were brief documents of 
intent, lacking details regarding rules and procedures for tariff and nontariff 
reductions, harmonization of tariff codes, determination of local content, and 
mechanism for dispute settlement. The CEPT agreement was largely ham- 
mered out by  government officials, without prior studies on feasibilities and 
impacts and little public debate on the issues. Second, the CEPT agreement 
had a time frame of 15 years (up to 2008) to bring tariffs down to 0-5  percent, 
covering manufactures (including processed agricultural products), but exclud- 
ing unprocessed agricultural products. The time frame was too long and would 
render AFTA  irrelevant in view of  the agreements reached in the Uruguay 
Round, the proposals for APEC trade and investment liberalization, and the 
competitive challenges ASEAN countries face for export markets and foreign 
investments. As it was, the fall in investment commitments in 1992-93 in Indo- 
nesia and Malaysia was attributed in part to investment diversion to China and, 
to a lesser extent, to Vietnam. In recognition of  these factors, in September 
1994 the ASEAN governments agreed to  shorten the time frame to 10 years 
(2003) and to extend the sectoral coverage to all goods, including unprocessed 
agricultural products. 
Third, the flexibility allowed in setting start-up dates and frequency and 
depth of  tariff cuts to the 20 percent level in the first eight years provided 
the opportunity for individual countries to procrastinate. There were strong 
pressures in some countries to delay implementation, as industry groups fearful 
of regional competition lobbied for more time for adjustment. Press reports of 
such delays undermined the credibility of AFTA, and the flexible time schedule 
created uncertainty for business planning. This led to the subsequent decision 
that all countries would have to implement the CEPT by January 1994, with a 
six-month delay for Brunei. 
Fourth, in view of the reciprocity condition, very few CEPT items will reach 
commonality of  preferences until the end of  the implementation time frame; 
tariff preferences will be largely bilateral (Wisarn 1994). Likewise, the tempo- 
rary exclusion list includes a large number of  items in electrical machinery, 
automobiles, and parts and accessories, that is, tariff items that are of interest 
to the globalization strategy of MNCs. ASEAN countries urgently need to har- 
monize their tariff regimes to facilitate common preference accession and utili- 
zation, and the temporary lists should be reduced through more frequent re- 
views. 
Fifth, administering the 40 percent rule of origin (national and cumulative) 
and keeping some tariffs at the 5 percent level raise the transaction costs of 
intraregional trade. The 40 percent rule represented a compromise; too high a 
requirement would disqualify many products from the CEPT concessions, but 290  Chia Sow  Yue 
too low a requirement would increase the probability of trade deflection, as 
extraregional imports would enter the ASEAN market via low-tariff countries 
and free trade zones. However, to the extent that the objective of the CEPT is 
to improve the competitiveness of ASEAN  industries rather than to protect 
ASEAN markets, trade deflection should not be a contentious issue; ASEAN 
should not discriminate  against lower-cost non-ASEAN  sourcing of  capital 
goods, intermediate  inputs, and raw materials as these would help improve 
ASEAN competitiveness. 
For a product to enjoy CEFT concessions it must satisfy the following-be 
on the CEPT inclusion lists of both exporting and importing countries, have an 
approved tariff reduction schedule, and have at least 40 percent ASEAN con- 
tent either on a single-country or cumulative-ASEAN basis; products that have 
tariff rates of  20 percent and below in the exporting country are eligible for 
concessions on these products in the importing country, while products that 
have tariff rates of over 20 percent in the exporting country can enjoy the con- 
cessions on these products in the importing country only if the tariffs on these 
products are also over 20 percent. Quantitative restrictions would be removed 
upon enjoyment of  CEPT concessions, but other nontariff barriers  would be 
eliminated only within five years from enjoyment of concessions. 
As is evident from table 10.6, there is a wide dispersion of tariff rates among 
ASEAN countries and among sectors. By 1995 Singapore had dismantled all 
CEPTs. Thailand has the highest average tariff level (16.9 percent), followed 
by the Philippines (13.8 percent), Indonesia (12.6 percent), Malaysia (7.3 per- 
cent), and Brunei (2.6 percent). There are no tariffs above 20 percent average 
at the sectoral level in Malaysia and Brunei. In Thailand, they are found on 
food products, plastics, wood and wood products, footwear, arms and ammuni- 
tion, and miscellaneous manufactured articles; in Indonesia, they are found on 
foodstuffs, plastics, footwear, miscellaneous manufactured articles, and works 
of art and antiques; and in the Philippines, they are confined to arms and am- 
munition, miscellaneous manufactured articles, and works of art and antiques. 
The CEPT reductions  follow  a dual track schedule. Under the fast track 
schedule covering over 15 product groups, tariffs of 20 percent and below will 
be reduced to 0-5  percent by  1998, while those above 20 percent will be re- 
duced to the same level by 2000.4 Under the normal track schedule covering 
all other CEPT product groups, tariffs of 20 percent and below will be reduced 
to 0-5  percent by 2000, while tariffs above 20 percent will be reduced in two 
stages, to 20 percent by  1998 and to 0-5  percent by 2003. For the first stage, 
there is no preagreed schedule of tariff reduction to the 20 percent level; indi- 
4. Initially, 15 product groups were identified for the fast track, namely, vegetable oils, chemi- 
cals, fertilizers, rubber products, pulp and paper, wooden and rattan furniture, gems and jewelery 
products, cement, pharmaceuticals, plastics, leather products, textiles, ceramics and glass prod- 
ucts, copper cathodes, and electronics. These have since been extended to include machinery and 
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Table 10.6  CEPT Rates by Country and Sector, 1995 
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Source: ASEAN Secretariat, unpublished data 
vidual countries were given the freedom to decide on starting dates and fre- 
quency and depth of  tariff cuts, which meant that cuts could effectively be 
postponed to as close to the deadline as possible. For the second stage, tariff 
reduction follows a preagreed schedule. The CEPT provides for two categories 
of exclusions. The general exclusion list includes products exempted on public 
policy  grounds,  such as national  security, public morals,  and protection  of 
goods of artistic, historic, or archaeological value; most exempted products are 
armaments, animals and plants, and alcoholic beverages. A temporary exclu- 
sion list exempts certain sensitive items; however, these products will be trans- 
ferred into the inclusion list in five equal installments starting in January 1996. 
The tariff items covered by the CEPT are shown in table 10.7. Of a total of 
44,095 tariff items, 58.8 percent are in the normal track, 33.7 percent in the Table 10.7  Tariff Lines in the CEPT by Country and Sector 
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Table 10.8  Average CEPT Rates by Country, 1996-2003 
Country  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Brunei  2.46  2.29  1.91  1.74  1.39  1.39  1.39  1.39 
Indonesia  11.63  10.61  8.84  7.91  5.81  5.70  5.00  4.25 
Malaysia  5.93  5.14  4.42  3.67  2.90  2.83  2.83  2.83 
Philippines  9.17  8.33  7.16  6.53  5.42  4.90  4.89  3.73 
Singapore  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Thailand  14.10  12.69  10.15  9.28  7.00  6.99  5.78  4.63 
ASEAN-6  7.76  7.00  5.79  5.19  3.97  3.88  3.47  2.95 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (1995b). 
fast track, and 7.5 percent in the temporary exclusion list.5  The largest numbers 
of normal track tariff items are in base metals and metal products and machin- 
ery and electrical appliances. Almost half the fast track items are textiles and 
garments. The temporary exclusion lists represent sectors and products which 
the ASEAN countries are not yet ready to liberalize. They are concentrated in 
chemicals and plastics and motor vehicles. Among countries, machinery and 
electrical appliances ranked first in the exclusion list of Brunei, chemicals in 
Indonesia, textiles in the Philippines, and vehicles in Malaysia and Thailand. 
The simple average of the CEPT rates was 12.8 percent in 1993, ranging from 
a high of 22.6 percent for Thailand to a low of 0.4 percent for Singapore. The 
average CEPT rate for the ASEAN-6 will fall to 2.3 percent by  2003, ranging 
from 4.6 percent for Thailand to zero tariffs for Singapore (table 10.8). 
Intraregional trade in CEPT products grew rapidly in 1993-94. Intraregional 
exports of  CEPT products reached U.S.$32.8  billion  in  1993 and  rose to 
U.S.$49.8 billion in  1994 (excluding Singaporean exports to Indonesia for 
which data are not available), recording 51.7 percent growth (table 10.9). Sin- 
gapore accounted for 54.2 percent of the CEPT exports in 1994, followed by 
Malaysia (25.9 percent), Indonesia (10.1 percent), Thailand (6.6 percent), the 
Philippines (2.3 percent), and Brunei (0.9 percent). Singapore is the leading 
export destination for all the ASEAN countries, except for Brunei. Singapore 
and the Philippines experienced the fastest growth in CEPT exports of  over 
90 percent. For intraregional imports of  CEPT products in  1994 (excluding 
Singaporean imports from Indonesia for which data are not available), Singa- 
pore accounted for 60.5 percent, followed by  Malaysia (20.8 percent), Thai- 
land (7.7 percent), Indonesia (5.6 percent), the Philippines (3.3 percent), and 
Brunei (2.1 percent). Singapore is the leading import source for all ASEAN 
countries except Thailand. 
The fifth ASEAN summit in December 1995 endorsed an accelerated tariff 
5. The tariff lines are not strictly comparable across countries and sectors due to differences 
between levels of  disaggregation. While Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have tariff 
codes disaggregated at the nine-digit level, those of the Philippines are disaggregated at the eight- 
digit level, and those of Thailand are a mixture of six-digit and nine-digit codes. Table 10.9  Intra-ASEAN Trade of CEPT Products, 1993-94  (million U.S. dollars) 
Country  Year  Brunei  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand  ASEAN-6 
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reduction schedule for 1996 that included the first installment of products pre- 
viously in the temporary exclusion list, the bulk of  unprocessed agricultural 
products, and the first package by  Vietnam (which joined AFTA  in January 
1996). This package comprised 94 percent of the total number of  tariff lines 
in ASEAN. 
AFTA cannot be inward looking. The ASEAN regional market is too small 
for inward-looking regionalism, so that the promotion of intra-ASEAN trade 
should not be at the expense of extra-ASEAN trade. Further, to the extent that 
ASEAN production is heavily dependent on extraregional sourcing of capital 
and intermediate inputs, focusing on intra-ASEAN trade liberalization alone 
would not  significantly reduce production costs. ASEAN countries need to 
simultaneously reduce barriers on imports of  production  inputs from non- 
ASEAN sources. Intraregional trade liberalization should be seen as the first 
step toward  global liberalization. In fact, when  Singapore implemented its 
AFTA  obligations by  removing almost all tariffs in  1993, it also decided to 
multilateralize its tariff concessions. More recently, Indonesia has announced 
a program of tariff reductions, lowering both CEPTs and most-favored-nation 
tariffs, though the latter were kept higher than the former. 
10.3.4  Extending beyond the CEPT 
The 1992 AFTA agreement has the CEPT as its cornerstone, with general 
provisions for the exploration of nonborder areas of cooperation, such as the 
harmonization of standards, reciprocal recognition of tests and certification of 
products, removal of barriers to foreign investment, macroeconomic consulta- 
tions, fair competition rules, and promotion of  venture capital.h The AFTA 
agreement is much less comprehensive and specific than NAFTA, which has 
extensive and specific provisions on liberalization of  nontariff barriers, trade 
in services, and investment flows and on protection of  intellectual property. 
Since 1992, however, ASEAN has not only accelerated its tariff reductions 
but also progressively extended its liberalization and cooperation schemes to 
include these areas. 
The CEFT focuses on tariff reductions and intra-ASEAN trade liberalization 
in  goods. Yet  tariffs may  not represent the  most  serious obstacle to intra- 
ASEAN trade, and tariff reductions may have no substantive impact on trade 
growth.’ Quantitative restrictions and other nontariff barriers are often more 
6.  The ASEAN Secretariat was asked to look into nonborder areas of cooperation. Products at 
the HS seven- and nine-digit levels are being reviewed to ensure comparability of product nomen- 
clature. The ASEAN Consultative Committee on Standards and Quality was established to work 
on harmonization of standards, testing of accreditation of laboratories, conformity assessment, and 
technical information. The Consultative Forum on Foreign Direct Investment was convened in 
February 1993 and meets on a regular basis to exchange views as to how to improve the investment 
climate in ASEAN. 
7. One study by Imada, Montes, and Naya (1991) based on a partial equilibrium approach has 
shown that an assumed 50 percent tariff cut would increase intra-ASEAN trade as a percentage of 297  ASEAN: Free Trade Areas and Growth Triangles 
serious deterrents to intra-ASEAN trade than tariffs.R  Traders are discouraged 
by border barriers such as tedious import documentation and procedures and 
disputes over arbitrary customs valuation and rules of  origin, as well as by 
nonborder obstacles such as lack of harmonized standards, sanitary regula- 
tions, and labeling and packaging  requirements.  Further, liberalizing  intra- 
ASEAN trade alone may not be the best approach to fostering ASEAN export 
and investment competitiveness. Additionally, the focus on merchandise trade 
neglects the growing importance of trade in services and investment flows. 
In September 1994 ASEAN officials agreed on the harmonization of tariff 
nomenclature in ASEAN beyond the HS six-digit international uniform defini- 
tion, that is at the HS eight- to nine-digit level. On nontariff barriers, officials 
are cooperating on customs valuation systems and procedures, including com- 
mon customs declaration forms and import and export procedures; elimination 
of nontariff barriers relating to technical standards; and harmonization and mu- 
tual recognition of sanitary and phytosanitary measures for agriculture prod- 
ucts. In  April  1995 ASEAN officials agreed to work toward  a Framework 
Agreement on Cooperation in Services, to include liberalization as well as 
cooperation in trade in services, the idea being to go beyond the Uruguay 
Round  General Agreement  on  Trade in Services  (GATS); to  implement  a 
Framework Agreement  on Intellectual  Property  Cooperation  and set up  an 
ASEAN patent system and an ASEAN trademark system; and to explore coop- 
eration in transport and communication as a trade facilitation measure. 
In  December  1995, the ASEAN  summit adopted  the ASEAN  Industrial 
Cooperation (AICO) scheme to replace the BBC and AIJV schemes. The ap- 
proval process is simpler and speedier, with applications processed within two 
months. AICO products will enjoy immediate free market access rather than 
the scheduled tariff reductions under AFTA. To  be eligible, a project has to 
involve at least two ASEAN countries and companies must have at least 30 
percent  national  equity.  In  response  to  the  growing  concern  regarding 
ASEAN’s competitiveness as an investment location, the ASEAN summit also 
agreed to establish an ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) to complement AFTA, 
to promote foreign and intraregional direct investments. A working group has 
been established to explore specific measures. 
- 
total trade by 2.3 percent for imports and 3.4  percent for exports. The biggest gainer on the import 
side would be Malaysia (4.4 percent) and on the export side Singapore (4.2 percent). To the extent 
that dynamic effects are not considered, the gains have been underestimated. The same study, 
using a general equilibrium trade-linked model, has shown the gains to be larger. Malaysia would 
have the largest share of  intra-ASEAN exports (35.6 percent), while Singapore would have the 
largest share of intra-ASEAN imports (33.0 percent). 
8. Kumar (1992) highlighted some of  the nontariff barriers in intra-ASEAN trade, including 
standards testing procedures, customs classifications and valuation procedures, subsidy schemes 
for domestic producers and purchasers, local content rules, and health and safety standards. 298  Chia Siow Yue 
10.3.5  ASEAN Growth Triangles 
The Growth of Subregionalism 
Subregionalism is a growing phenomenon in East Asia, as manifested in 
the rapid emergence of subregional economic zones (SREZs), variously called 
growth triangles, transnational economic zones, and natural economic temtor- 
ies. These are transnational investment zones that encompass geographically 
contiguous countries and subnational areas. The integration process has cut 
across not only political boundaries but also political and economic systems. 
The driving force is the private sector. Governments act as facilitators, remov- 
ing the political and policy barriers to economic exchange, providing and pro- 
moting the development of physical infrastructure, and offering investment in- 
centives to the private sector. 
SREZs exploit the advantages of  geographical proximity and  economic 
complementarity (Chia and Lee 1993). Geographical proximity is often linked 
with cultural and linguistic affinities, and together they reduce economic dis- 
tance and transaction costs, but the removal of policies restricting border flows 
and the availability of facilitating transportation and telecommunications must 
still be addressed. Border restrictions have been tumbling in East Asia with the 
end of the Cold War and with political and economic reforms in socialist coun- 
tries and trade and investment liberalization among market economies. For 
trade in goods, proximity reduces transport costs as well as delivery time, an 
important consideration with time-sensitive products, rapid changes in con- 
sumer tastes and shortened product cycles. For trade in services, direct con- 
tacts between producers and suppliers and between buyers and clients are often 
necessary for transactions to take place. For investment decisions, proximity 
reduces information costs, of  particular importance for small and medium- 
sized enterprises without ready access to investment and market information, 
and for investors who have to operate in unfamiliar political, bureaucratic, and 
legal environments with complex and nontransparent rules and regulations, 
and deal with local business partners with different business and accounting 
practices. Transportation and telecommunications infrastructures are needed to 
enable cross-border movements of goods and people and flows of information. 
Supporting infrastructure is also needed to promote development of  natural 
resources, tourism, and industries. 
Economic complementarity arises from differences in factor endowments 
and in stages of economic development and is reflected by  differential factor 
prices and cost structures. As land and natural resources are immobile and 
governments continue to restrict cross-border labor flows, capital becomes the 
mobile factor and investments flow from the more developed core of the SREZ 
to the less developed periphery. The core also performs an intermediation role, 
channeling investments from other countries to the periphery, helping to import 
machinery and intermediate inputs needed by the periphery and exporting its 
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The most developed SREZ is the Greater South China zone encompassing 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China’s south coastal provinces of Fujian and Guang- 
dong, where geographical proximity has been facilitated by ethnic, cultural, 
and linguistic affinities9  In the ASEAN region, three growth triangles among 
member states have emerged, and national and subnational governments act as 
the major facilitators. 
IMS, IMI: and BIMP Growth Triangles 
The  IMS  (Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore)  Growth  Triangle  (GT),  more 
commonly  known  as the  SIJORI (Singapore-Johor-Riau) Growth Triangle, 
was proposed in the late 1980s as an alternative mode of ASEAN economic 
cooperation to the more contentious FTA. It does not require the participation 
of all ASEAN countries (the “6 minus x” principle) and emphasizes resource 
pooling and investment cooperation rather than market integration. The IMS- 
GT comprises the three contiguous areas of Indonesia’s Riau islands, Malay- 
sia’s southern state of Johor, and the city-state of Singapore. The growth trian- 
gle enhances the investment competitiveness of  the subregion by  combining 
the resources and advantages of  economically advanced and less advanced 
areas, integrating the availability of capital, technology, and human resources 
with the availability of land, natural resources, and labor. Such a combination 
of productive resources is generally not simultaneously available within a na- 
tional contiguous area at a given time. For this reason, a transnational growth 
triangle is a much more attractive investment location than a national economic 
zone. At the subregional level, there  are economies of scale and clustering 
and specialization according to comparative advantage. At the enterprise level, 
geographical proximity facilitates the establishment of production and distri- 
bution networks. 
Government support has been crucial in launching the IMS-GT. Indonesia 
proposed investment cooperation with Singapore to increase the attraction of 
Riau as an investment destination as its earlier effort to promote Batam island 
(part of Riau) as a logistics base and industrial export processing zone had met 
with limited success. The development of Riau also serves Indonesia’s strategy 
of developing its regional peripheries. For Johor, further integration with Sin- 
gapore will enable it to exploit the metropolitan spillover effect to accelerate 
its economic and industrial development. For the Singapore city-state, Riau 
and  Johor  provide  much-needed  economic  space.  Land  and  labor  short- 
ages and accompanying rising costs necessitate  the relocation  of  land- and 
labor-intensive industries and processes. Relocation nearby will enable foreign 
MNCs in Singapore to retain their higher value-added functions in Singapore 
and thus consolidate Singapore’s position as a manufacturing base and services 
hub. Relocation nearby by Singaporean enterprises will enable them to engage 
9. For a comparison of ASEAN growth triangles and the Greater South China SREZ, see Chia 
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in outward investments in a less unfamiliar environment, which reduces risks 
and helps economize on managerial and technical resources. Singapore’s coop- 
eration is also strongly motivated by  its heavy dependence on Johor for water 
supply and its search for new water resources in Riau. 
The liberalization of foreign investment regulations in Batam (where regula- 
tions are more liberal than found in the rest of Indonesia), Singapore’s partici- 
pation in Batam’s infrastructural development, and strong Singapore govern- 
ment  endorsement of  Batam  as  an  industrial  location  led  to  a  surge  of 
investment in Batam by foreign MNCs based in Singapore and by Singaporean 
companies. The success of  Batam led to investment cooperation’s being ex- 
tended  to Bintan and other Riau  islands. Singaporean investments include 
multibillion-dollar  joint ventures with the Indonesian private sector to develop 
industrial and tourism facilities in Batam and Bintan. 
Geographical proximity and economic complementarity are crucial factors 
in the development of IMS-GT. For businesses located in Batam-Bintan and 
Johor, doing business with and through Singapore is much more cost efficient 
and time saving as Singapore provides world class transportation, telecommu- 
nications, financial, and commercial infrastructures. Batam is only a 30-45- 
minute ferry ride from Singapore, and Johor is linked to Singapore by  a cause- 
way  (with another under construction). Investors can commute daily or fre- 
quently from Singapore to supervise operations and attend to production and 
distribution problems. Singapore offers a more comfortable and convenient 
living environment for business executives and their families. There are also 
strong economic complementarities between Singapore and Johor and Riau. 
Singapore has abundant financial resources, managerial and professional ex- 
pertise, and well-developed financial, transportation, and telecommunications 
infrastructure. Riau and Johor can offer land and labor at lower cost than in 
Singapore. Their unique proximity to Singapore increases their attraction for 
regional and foreign investors. 
The success of the IMS-GT has prompted the implementation of two more 
growth  triangles  in  ASEAN.  The  northern,  or  IMT  (Indonesia-Malaysia- 
Thailand), Growth Triangle covers contiguous areas of west Indonesia, north 
Malaysia, and south Thailand, with a larger geographical area and population 
base  than  the  IMS-GT. The  eastern,  or  BIMP-EAGA  (Brunei-Indonesia- 
Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN) Growth Area encompasses four ASEAN 
countries: Brunei, west Indonesia, east Malaysia, and south Philippines. It is 
larger than the IMT-GT in area and is geographically more dispersed. In both 
cases, facilitating transportation infrastructure is crucial to the development of 
subnational linkages. 
Issues and Challenges 
The IMS-GT is a transnational phenomenon involving relations at many lev- 
els. The relocation of  industries from the core to  the periphery results in 
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Singapore’s outward investment in response to labor and land shortages and 
industrial upgrading will create domestic dislocations anyway,  whether the 
growth triangle phenomenon  exists or not. In  a dynamic economy the re- 
trenched workers can be readily redeployed, particularly if appropriate retrain- 
ing programs are in place, and scarce domestic resources can be put to more 
productive use. In the peripheral areas of Johor and Batam, the influx of for- 
eign investment and associated managerial and professional resources raises 
economic growth and employment and industrialization prospects. However, 
rapid foreign investment penetration has raised concerns about national sover- 
eignty, the centrifugal forces that draw a country’s periphery to a foreign core, 
dilution of central-provincial government relations, and inadequate economic 
linkages with the domestic economy. The presence of foreign investors, mana- 
gerial and professional personnel, and visitors also puts pressure on housing 
and infrastructure, and a large influx of workers from rural areas, particularly 
young female workers, can create social problems. 
The sustainability of the IMS-GT depends on the continuing investment at- 
tractions of Johor and Riau. For Johor an emerging problem is the worsening 
shortage of labor, and investors will have to move into non-labor-intensive in- 
dustries. For Batam and Riau, the need to recruit labor from Java and the 30- 
year land-lease system add to production costs and investor uncertainty. And 
as Indonesia liberalizes its investment regime, the special investment incen- 
tives for Riau are lost; Java has the strong attraction of  a large labor pool and 
a large domestic market. A recent Indonesian government decision has ex- 
tended the land lease to 80 years, and developments on Bintan are focusing on 
tourism and natural resource development as well. 
Geographical proximity and economic complementarity are less obvious in 
the IMT-GT and BIMP-EAGA than in the IMS-GT. A lack of transportation 
infrastructure linking the subnational areas, particularly in the BIMP-EAGA, 
has increased economic distance and transaction costs. The subnational areas 
in these two growth triangles are also more alike in terms of factor endowments 
and levels of  economic and industrial development. Neither triangle has an 
equivalent to Singapore in the IMS-GT, a participant that provides metropoli- 
tan  spillover and  investment, financial, transportation, telecommunications, 
commercial, and managerial resources. In the IMT-GT, Penang acts as the met- 
ropolitan core, but Penang is much smaller than Singapore and its hinterland 
lies in Malaysia rather than across the border. In the BIMP-EAGA, Brunei is 
financially rich and Labuan (Malaysia) is an emerging offshore financial cen- 
ter, but the growth triangle lacks an industrial leader. 
The IMT-GT and BIMP-EAGA will thus need a different focus from the 
IMS-GT. Subregional cooperation will need to emphasize the joint develop- 
ment of infrastructure, natural resources, and tourism. This will enable the two 
subregions to enjoy economies of scale and agglomeration and to improve their 
competitiveness in securing investment. For common resources straddling land 
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prove environmental management. However, the central challenge in the devel- 
opment of the IMT-GT and BIMP-EAGA is mobilizing the financial resources 
required for infrastructure-related development. Total infrastructure financing 
needs of developing East Asia over the next five to six years are estimated to 
be U.S.$l-2.5 trillion, and only a very small part of this is likely to be met from 
the resources of  multilateral and regional development agencies and official 
development assistance programs. The bulk of financing required for invest- 
ment in infrastructure development and in productive capacity in the IMT-GT 
and BIMP-EAGA will have to be mobilized from private sources. Both private 
loan financing and private investments have to meet stringent criteria regarding 
political and management risks and commercial viability. It remains to be seen 
how many of  the ambitious schemes envisaged and proposed in the IMT-GT 
and BIMP-EAGA can meet such criteria. 
10.3.6  Growth Triangle versus Free Trade Area 
The growth triangle has several advantages over the free trade area (FTA) as 
a modality of ASEAN economic cooperation. 
First, the growth triangle avoids some of the problems in regional economic 
integration faced by  countries at different stages of  economic development, 
and even different economic and political systems (as demonstrated by  the 
Greater South China economic zone). The FTA  is a formal institutionalized 
regional arrangement. Negotiations can be protracted, as they  must cover a 
wide range of  trade-related policies and regulations. Wide disparities in in- 
come levels, industrial competence, and trade policy create serious problems 
in reaching consensus on the pace and extent of trade liberalization and percep- 
tion of distribution of  benefits and costs. In contrast, the growth triangle ex- 
ploits differences in factor endowments and levels of development to mutual 
advantage. Furthermore, the “6 minus x” principle is easier to implement in a 
growth triangle than in an FIA. Countries that see little benefit need not partic- 
ipate, but they do not spoil the chances for countries that wish to do so. 
Second, a growth triangle is more limited in geographical scope and thus 
politically more manageable and functionally more flexible. Existing growth 
triangles cover only parts of sovereign states, except for the small city-state of 
Singapore and the small sultanate of Brunei. For countries unready to open up 
across the board and lacking financial resources for infrastructural develop- 
ment of peripheral areas, participation in a growth triangle limits political risks 
and financial commitments. If  the experiment in economic cooperation fails, 
the political risks can be well contained; if it is successful, the experiment can 
be replicated in different parts of the country and with different partners. The 
scope for cooperation is more flexible. It need not include or end with intra- 
trade liberalization. In actual practice, cooperation has included joint invest- 
ments in  infrastructure, tourism, and industry and facilitation measures for 
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deeper than in an FTA. It takes less time to implement specific cooperation 
schemes in a growth triangle, and the benefits are more directly visible. 
Third, for larger and geographically dispersed countries, a growth triangle 
helps promote balanced regional development, as peripheral areas of a country 
can be drawn into the mainstream of development by linking with more devel- 
oped areas across the border. A country can participate in several growth trian- 
gles at the same time, with different modalities of cooperation and projects to 
meet specific local needs and conditions. Thus Indonesia is linking its north- 
western,  southern, and  eastern peripheries to  different growth  triangles in 
ASEAN with different combinations of partners. 
Fourth, a growth triangle focuses on economic complementarity to attract 
investments to produce for the subregional and international markets rather 
than on enlarging the regional market and protecting it against external compe- 
tition. A growth triangle is less likely to be perceived as a zero-sum game. 
Domestic enterprises are less threatened by more competitive goods from part- 
ner countries. And since a growth triangle is obviously not a discriminatory 
trading bloc, it is also more acceptable to nonmembers. In fact, nonmembers 
are actively encouraged to participate in the benefits of the triangle through the 
investment process. A growth triangle is thus consistent with the objectives of 
free trade and efficient resource allocation. 
10.4  Conclusion 
Politically, ASEAN has succeeded in establishing regional stability by help- 
ing to overcome traditional sensitivities arising from differences in historical, 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious backgrounds, defusing border disputes, al- 
laying the fears of smaller nations regarding their larger neighbors’ territorial 
ambitions, and providing the stable underpinnings for each member country to 
pursue economic development with minimal distraction. There is an emerging 
sense of an ASEAN community. ASEAN is also widely respected internation- 
ally for its moderating influence with respect to many political and economic 
issues and for its economic success. 
However, for the first 25 years, ASEAN’s progress in economic cooperation 
and integration had been less satisfactory, and the level of economic integration 
was low, except for regional connections to Singapore. To the extent that trade 
preferences have not promoted the growth of intra-ASEAN trade faster than 
extraregional trade, discrimination has not been trade diverting and has not 
imposed welfare loss on  traditional trading partners. Whether intra-ASEAN 
trade liberalization and industrial cooperation have been directly welfare en- 
hancing is debatable. The preferential trade agreement entailed endless meet- 
ings of ASEAN economic officials, with limited results. Likewise, industrial 
cooperation  schemes  contributed  little  to  the  industrial  development  of 
ASEAN countries. The growth triangle is more welfare enhancing. And to the 304  Chia Siow Yue 
extent that AFTA contributes to the lowering of most-favored-nation tariffs and 
nontariff barriers and increased investment improves growth performance, the 
trade creation effects should outweigh the trade diversion effects and regional- 
ism should contribute to multilateralism. 
The ASEAN region was the world’s most dynamic over the past decade. The 
economies  are expected  to remain  buoyant  over the next decade. However, 
dramatic geopolitical and economic changes regionally and globally have con- 
fronted ASEAN  and its economies with  several challenges. Regional peace 
and security is being threatened by the rise of regional powers and temtorial 
disputes in the South China Sea. The purpose of the ASEAN Regional Forum 
is to defuse such tensions.  On the economic front, ASEAN faces intensified 
regional and global competition for markets and investments. ASEAN coun- 
tries want to enhance their competitiveness as a production base and invest- 
ment location. Trade and investment  liberalization and facilitation measures 
under AFTA, AIA, and the growth triangles will help achieve this objective. 
AFTA is too small to be inward looking. ASEAN has a population exceeding 
those of  the European Union and NAFTA, but its GNP size is less than  10 
percent of each of those two groupings. This has encouraged ASEAN to prac- 
tice “open regionalism”; some member countries have multilateralized their 
trade liberalization under AFTA. ASEAN economic cooperation can move be- 
yond AFTA and take advantage of the de facto economic integration process 
in the Asia Pacific that has resulted from growing trade and investment link- 
ages forged by the private sector. To do this, ASEAN policymakers could re- 
duce barriers to trade and investment flows through liberalization and facilita- 
tion measures,  encourage their private  sectors to be engines of  growth, and 
develop strategic trade and investment linkages with other dynamic economies, 
subregions, and free trade areas. ASEAN’s active participation in the APEC 
forum and  overtures  to building  linkages  with Australia and New  Zealand, 
NAFTA, and Western Europe are building blocks toward multilateralism. 
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Comment  Mario B. Lamberte 
Chia’s paper provides an excellent and objective review of ASEAN’s accom- 
plishments in the area of trade and industrial cooperation in the past 25 years, 
the most recent of which are the ASEAN free trade area (AFTA) initiative and 
the formation of subregional economic zones or growth triangles. 
As accurately pointed out by Chia, AFTA was born without the benefit of 
the rigorous studies and long discussions that usually precede the birth of trad- 
ing blocs. The ensuing intense debate carried out in each country on the man- 
ner and scope of  implementation of AFTA attests to this fact. More recently, 
some studies have been done  to shed light on the effects of AFTA on members’ 
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economies. It is worth mentioning some of  them here to add flavor to Chia’s 
discussion. Using an ASEAN Multi-Country Model to perform a simulation 
analysis over a seven-year period under AFTA, Yap and Edillon (1993) found 
that intra-ASEAN trade increased, but that the increase favored only Singapore 
in terms of  an improved trade balance. All ASEAN countries realized a net 
gain in terms of  long-run GDP growth; however, this gain was very modest. 
Teh (1993) also performed a simulation analysis using a computable general 
equilibrium model, focusing on the impact of the Common Effective Preferen- 
tial Tariff  (CEPT) on the Philippine economy. His results suggest that  the 
CEPT produces very little resource allocation or efficiency gains for the Philip- 
pines as reflected in projected share of  trade with ASEAN, sectoral growth 
rates, income distribution, and pattern  of  capital or labor allocation across 
broad sectors of the Philippine economy. 
Chia extensively discusses the advantages of the growth triangle over AFTA 
as a mode of ASEAN economic cooperation. However, it is not clear to me 
whether she considers growth triangles within ASEAN as  a  substitute for 
AFTA or an intermediate step toward AFTA. This is important because even if 
the financial resources each participating country in a growth triangle commits 
are small, their economic and social costs and benefits still must be evaluated 
properly. This is especially important in the case of the BIMG-EAGA, where 
the major factors that made SIJORI a successful story are less obvious. 
ASEAN  economic  cooperation,  of  course,  extends  beyond  AFTA  and 
growth triangles. Let me mention existing ASEAN cooperative arrangements 
in the area of banking and finance, which were not mentioned in Chia’s paper. 
These are the ASEAN Swap Arrangement; the use of ASEAN currencies in 
intra-ASEAN trade; the ASEAN Finance Corporation; the ASEAN Fund; and 
ASEAN cooperation in insurance.’ 
The ASEAN Swap Arrangement 
This arrangement was established by  the ASEAN central banks (excluding 
Brunei’s) in August  1977 to provide short-term swap facilities for member 
countries with temporary liquidity problems. It operates through swaps of U.S. 
dollars against the currency of the borrowing ASEAN country. Each member 
is supposed to contribute $40  million and may borrow up to $80 million. The 
arrangement is supposed to last for five years. Its success has already prompted 
the ASEAN central banks to renew it four times. The five ASEAN member 
countries take turns acting as managing agent. 
The arrangement provides a sort of  last resort facility for ASEAN central 
banks. None availed themselves of it in the first few years, and in the past few 
years ASEAN central banks have had easy access to other facilities. But in 
times of great need, ASEAN countries have turned to this facility. The Philip- 
pines, for instance, availed itself of the arrangement at the height of its balance- 
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of-payments problem. But it has not accessed the facility in the past few years 
when other financing facilities have become available. 
Liberalized Use of ASEAN Currencies in Intra-ASEAN Trade 
The idea originated in the ASEAN private banking sector, which proposed 
that ASEAN governments formally agree to permit ASEAN-based traders to 
use any ASEAN currency as the medium of exchange for intra-ASEAN trade. 
There are at least three advantages to this arrangement. First, it will conserve 
the hard currencies of ASEAN countries and at the same time promote intra- 
ASEAN trade. Second, it will ensure the supply of critical imports that can be 
readily supplied by ASEAN countries. And third, it will stimulate the expan- 
sion  of  intra-ASEAN banking  activity with  increased intra-ASEAN trade 
flows. 
This arrangement was  not difficult to forge since two of  the six ASEAN 
countries, namely, Singapore and Brunei, already have liberal foreign exchange 
policies that allow their traders to use any medium of exchange acceptable to 
the exporter. In other ASEAN counties, liberalization in the use of ASEAN 
currencies began in  1987 in response to the proposal of  the private banking 
sector. 
The results of the liberalization have been encouraging. All ASEAN coun- 
tries reported an increasing trend in the use of ASEAN currencies especially 
in those currencies that had not been accepted before as mediums of exchange. 
Reports of individual countries showed the following: 
Brunei Darussalam. Ninety-five percent of  accounts involving ASEAN trade 
were settled with ASEAN currencies. Available data on the value of  intra- 
ASEAN currency settlements through the commercial banks showed that the 
Singaporean dollar accounted for 82 percent. But what is notable is the in- 
creasing use of Malaysian, Philippine, and Thai currencies in the settlements. 
Indonesia. Of the total trade transactions with ASEAN countries, less than 20 
percent were settled in ASEAN currencies. The Singaporean dollar was the 
dominant settlement currency. 
Malaysia. Around 23-28  percent of its total receipts and 12-14  percent of its 
total payments were settled in ringgit. The Singaporean dollar was also widely 
used as a settlement currency, accounting for 5-7  percent of total receipts and 
about 10 percent of total payments. The rupiah, baht, and Bruneian dollar were 
also used to a lesser extent for trade settlement. 
Philippines. The available information on the value of intra-ASEAN currency 
settlements  pertains  to  the  Central  Bank’s  over-the-counter purchases  of 
ASEAN currencies. The statistics indicate continuing growth in the use of 
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noteworthy is the  significant rise in the Central Bank’s over-the-counter pur- 
chases of Malaysian, Bruneian, Thai, and Indonesian currencies during the pe- 
riod 1986-89. 
Thailand. The proportion of trade settled in ASEAN currencies compared to 
the value of Thailand’s trade with other ASEAN countries rose by  11.5 percent 
in 1989 against 10.7  percent in 1988. 
So far, the available information suggests that with the liberalization in the 
use of ASEAN currencies, ASEAN countries were able to conserve their hard 
currencies in intra-ASEAN trade transactions. However, it cannot yet be ascer- 
tained whether the arrangement has induced more trade among ASEAN coun- 
tries. 
ASEAN Finance Corporation 
The ASEAN Finance Corporation (AFC) is one of the concrete manifesta- 
tions of regional cooperation within the private banking sector under the lead- 
ership of the ASEAN Banking Council. It was set up in 1981 with five ASEAN 
countries  contributing  S$20 million  each  to  the  initial  capital  to  finance 
ASEAN  industrial  cooperative projects  and  to  provide  venture  capital  to 
ASEAN entrepreneurs. Schulze (1988) has already made a thorough assess- 
ment of the AFC, and most of his conclusions still hold today. Specifically, the 
AFC is generally liquid and is characterized by slow’  growth. Hence, it is not 
able to attract more equity funds. It is very much involved in money market 
activities. The AFC cannot be entirely be faulted for this since there were not 
enough industrial  cooperative  projects  to  support. But  other serious weak- 
nesses have been pointed out by  Schulze. One is that the conflict of  interest 
between shareholders and the AFC could have resulted in the latter’s accepting 
highly risky but less profitable ventures while the former take the less risky 
but more profitable ones. Another weakness is that being a private corporation, 
AFC could not tap cheap sources of funds usually given by donor foreign gov- 
ernments. 
ASEAN Fund, Limited 
The ASEAN Fund is another project of the ASEAN Banking Council that 
was recently launched. It is cashing in on the worldwide popularity of mutual 
funds to raise capital in more developed countries for investment in shares of 
stocks in less developed countries. 
The objectives of the fund are to 
1. provide a greater measure of liquidity for ASEAN stock markets, 
2. foster the development of unlisted small and medium-sized indigenous 
3. enhance visibility of  the ASEAN countries, and 
4.  help promote the respective countries’ fund management industries. 
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To attain the second objective, the fund will invest 20 percent of its initial 
proceeds in securities of emerging growth companies that are not listed on any 
securities exchange in ASEAN countries, while the remaining 80 percent will 
be invested principally in securities that are listed on a stock exchange in the 
ASEAN countries. The fund therefore provides a vehicle for investors seeking 
long-term capital appreciation through investments in securities of companies 
in the ASEAN countries. 
The fund is incorporated under the laws of Singapore. 
ASEAN Cooperation in Insurance 
The ASEAN Insurance Council (AIC), which is composed of the insurance 
commissioners of ASEAN countries, was established in 1978. Its annual meet- 
ing has continuously provided an excellent forum for the promotion of ASEAN 
cooperation in insurance. 
One of the accomplishments of the AIC is the construction of the Unified 
Forms of  Insurance Statistics. The objective of this project is to disseminate 
information  on market conditions and practices prevailing in each member 
country and to promote intra-ASEAN trade in insurance. 
Another important accomplishment of the AIC is the Comparative Study of 
Insurance and Supervision including Tax Laws on Insurance. The objective of 
this project is to keep member countries informed of current developments in 
insurance legislation and regulation. The report contains comprehensive and 
detailed information on the regulations governing the operations of insurance 
companies in the ASEAN countries. 
The private sector was not to be left out of ASEAN cooperation in the insur- 
ance sector. Private companies established in 1982 the ASEAN Reinsurance 
Pool with three separate pools, namely, a treaty pool (nonmarine), an excess- 
of-loss pool (nonmarine), and a facultative pool (nonmarine). The objective of 
the pool was to retain a significant proportion of reinsurance premiums that had 
been completely  captured before by  reinsurance companies of  non-ASEAN 
countries. In 1989, it was decided to replace the ASEAN Reinsurance Pool 
with the ASEAN Reinsurance Corporation to give it greater flexibility. It was 
incorporated in Singapore with insurance companies in ASEAN as the stock- 
holders. 
The governments of ASEAN countries have been providing support to the 
corporation. In the case of the Philippines, which used to have strict regulations 
on nontrade (invisible) payments in hard currencies before the 1991 foreign 
exchange deregulation, the insurance commissioner was given the authority to 
approve remittance of reinsurance premiums to reinsurance companies abroad. 
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Comment  Shang-Jin Wei 
In this informative and well-written paper, Chia (1) discusses the degree of 
economic linkage within ASEAN, emphasizing the distinction between “coop- 
eration” and “integration,” and (2)  advances economic and political economy 
arguments for growth triangles or subregional integration. I would like to com- 
ment on these two parts in turn. 
ASEAN as a Bloc 
First, as Chia points out in her paper, ASEAN has achieved its objectives as 
an effective security bloc. I have a slight disagreement with her, however, when 
she goes on to say that ASEAN should not also be judged by its degree of trade 
integration. I think that it should, at least partly. After all, it is not the case that 
ASEAN countries have never tried to establish a preferential trade area or a 
free trade area. They have  more than once. So how  integrated are ASEAN 
countries in terms of trade? 
To  see the actual degree of trade integration in ASEAN, we could look at 
the ratio of intra-ASEAN trade to ASEAN members’ total trade and how this 
ratio changes over time. If we do that, we find that that ratio has increased over 
time. But this ratio is not the best way  to address the question. Many things 
can cause this ratio to change over time, many of which have nothing to do with 
concerted efforts by  the ASEAN countries to increase cooperation in trade. 
For example, faster economic growth in the region can cause the ratio to rise 
over time. 
A better way to measure integration that can be more plausibly be attributed 
to collective action is, guess what, a gravity model. To illustrate, let me refer 
to table 1 of my paper with Jeffrey Frankel (chap. 5 in this volume). This is a 
panel regression on 1,953 country pairs over the period 1970-90.  Let me just 
note that the adjusted R2  of the regressions is very high (over 70 percent). Once 
we control for the contributions of economic sizes, geographic distance, and 
cultural links, we can add an ASEAN dummy that takes the value of  one for 
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trade between two ASEAN countries. The coefficient is 1.97, which implies 
that two ASEAN countries on average trade 600 percent (= exp(1.97) -  1) 
more than two otherwise identical economies. This is a strikingly large num- 
ber. If we take into account the possibility that Singapore may be an entrep8t 
for much intra-ASEAN trade, the estimate is lowered only slightly (from 1.97 
to 1.42). 
Before we conclude that ASEAN is highly integrated, we should entertain 
another possibility: East Asia in highly integrated, and ASEAN countries are 
no different from other East Asian economies. We can test this by adding a 
dummy for East Asia integration to the regression, and we find that this is 
indeed the case. Two East Asian economies trade many times more than two 
random countries outside the region. But once we have controlled for an East 
Asia  effect, ASEAN  countries  no  longer  show  any  additional  subregional 
trade bias. 
Hence, there is not a special ASEAN effect in (merchandise) trade. How- 
ever, this is probably not something to worry about. Some computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) studies compared two scenarios for ASEAN: (1) ASEAN 
forms a bloc of its own versus (2) ASEANjoins an East Asia bloc. They found 
that the latter generates higher welfare for ASEAN. I would venture to suggest 
that, if we add a third scenario-ASEAN  countries liberalize unilaterally- 
this would provide even higher welfare. 
Growth Triangles 
My second comment concerns growth triangles. Integration involving subre- 
gions of various neighboring countries has not received much attention from 
academic  economists.  Therefore,  I  find  Chia’s  discussion  valuable  and 
thought provoking. 
Upon some thinking I find myself to have some disagreement with Chia’s 
analysis. Chia is clearly strongly in favor of growth triangles. She argues that 
growth triangles have advantages over free trade areas (FTAs) both  on eco- 
nomic efficiency and political economy grounds. Her paper makes no mention 
of disadvantages of growth triangles relative to FTAs. I would like to suggest 
that efficiency gains of growth triangles are probably overrated. On the other 
hand, growth triangles can and often do play many useful political roles. 
To put it strongly, on efficiency grounds, I would suggest that subregional 
trade integration is almost always inferior to regional integration. Like FTAs, 
subregional  trade  integration  involves  trade  diversion  as well  as creation. 
Moreover, as subregional schemes involve smaller regions, there will be more 
diversion and less creation. 
Of course, growth triangles involve more than just free trade. They also en- 
tertain the promotion of investment, improvement of infrastructure, and coordi- 
nation of other economic policies. But the basic logic goes through. (As men- 
tioned above, some CGE studies find that it is better for ASEAN to be part of 
a broader bloc than to be an exclusive bloc of its own.) 
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growth triangles are third best, inferior to global integration (the first best) and 
regional integration (the second best). 
Of course, just as multilateral liberalization is often more difficult politically 
than regional integration, regional integration is sometimes more difficult than 
subregional integration. Therefore, there are some good political arguments 
for growth triangles, as Chia has aptly outlined. One particular role that subre- 
gional integration can play is in helping to reduce political risks for politicians. 
However, we  must keep in mind the compromise and trade-off involved in 
promoting growth triangles. Growth triangles should only be used as a building 
block or intermediate step toward further liberalization. 